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NOTES
SAVING A DYING SEA?
THE LONDON CONVENTION ON OCEAN DUMPING
"[T]he Atlantic ocean [sic] is beginning to become polluted, and a con-
tinued indiscriminate use of the world ocean as an international dumping
ground... may have irreparable effects on the survival of species."'
I
A PROBLEM?
The intentional discharge of oil, chemicals, and other matter by ocean-
going vessels is a major source of marine pollution.2 Oil discharges have
caused the deaths of thousands of birds,8 have threatened the existence of
1. Thor Heyerdahl quoted in Report of the Secretary-General, The Sea: Prevention
and Control of Marine Pollution, 51 U.N. ECOSOC, Annex 2, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/5003(1971) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Secretary-General].
Dr. Heyerdahl undertook two trans-Atlantic voyages to test the range of papyrus raft-
ships (Ra I and Ra I). On Ra II, oil pollution was reported on forty of tle first forty-
three days of the voyage (each voyage lasted approximately fifty-six days). At a point
equidistant from the African and North American continents metal cans, plastic con-
tainers, and "seemingly endless quantities of oil clots" were observed. Id. at 2.
William Ruckelshaus, while Administrator of the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, admitted that "the [United States] has permitted unregulated and dam-
aging dumping into the oceans .... But we now know with very little time to spare,
that the ocean is fragile." [1970-1971 Transfer Binder: Current Developments] BNA
ENmoNamr REP. 1277, 1281.
2. Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International Law: A Canadian Perspective, 3 J.MARrME L. & Com. 13, 15 (1971). The yearly intentional discharge of oil has been
estimated at one million tons. Marks, Pollution of the Seas by Crude Oil-A Proposalfor Effective Remedial Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 80, 81 (1972); Schachter & Serwer, Marine
Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 84, 89 (1971).
The oil is dumped after the tanker's cargo has been discharged and sea water has
been taken into the oil tanker's dirty cargo tanks to help ballast the ship. When the
ship is ready for a new cargo of oil the water plus residual oil from the previous cargo
is pumped into the harbor or ocean. Marks, supra, at 82; Note, Continental Shelf Oil
Disasters: Challenge to International Pollution Control, 55 CoRN=uu L. Rxv. 113, 118(1969). There is a technique for reducing this type of pollution (for a detailed descrip-
tion of the "Load-on-Top" technique, see Holdsworth, Ballast and Wash Waters fromTankers, in WATra POLLUTION BY OIL 195, 197-201 (P. Hepple ed. 1971), but the smaller
refineries are not willing to adapt their equipment to process oil contaminated with
traces of sea water-ld. at 201; and the tanker charterers are not always willing to sacri-
fice the space filled by the residual oil. Id. Rienow & Rienow, The Oil Around Us, N.Y.
Times, June 4, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 115.
3. Marks, supra note 2, at 82 n.27.
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a dietary staple,4 and have led to reports of fish which taste like crude
oil.5 Additionally, oil and other pollutants are suspected of killing micro-
scopic life forms near the surface of the ocean, thereby altering many of
the ocean's food chains, 6 and causing the reduction of a food resource
relied upon by more than one-half of the world's population.7
The industrialized nations of the world have been using the oceans as
a dumping ground for radioactive wastes, sewage sludge, and discarded
chemical and biological weapons.8 The Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean
Sea are rapidly becoming "dead seas," 9 and sewage sludge dumped by
New York City into international waters near the mouth of New York
harbor has created an additional "dead sea" area.' 0
Recently a public outcry was raised over the United States Army's plan
to dump nerve gas rockets in an international dumping site east of Cape
Kennedy." Also the British are reported to have dumped quantities of
nerve gas and mustard gas into the Atlantic,'12 and steel drums containing
radioactive equipment, dumped into the Atlantic Ocean by the United
States Atomic Energy Commission, have been trawled up by fishermen
off the coast of Oregon.s In 1971 only the United States Environmental
4. Malaysia apparently fears that dumping by ships in the Strait of Malacca may
endanger the existence of its inhabitants' primary source of food. U.N. Doc. A/AC.
138/SC. 2/SR. 11 (1971).
5. Schachter & Serwer, supra note 2, at 90-91.
6. Lanctot, Marine Pollution: A Critique of Present and Proposed International
Agreements and Institutions-A Suggested Global Oceans' Environmental Regime, 24
HAST. L.J. 67, 70 (1972); Rienow & Rienow, supra note 2, at 110; Nanda, The Torrey
Canyon Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J. 400, 403 (1967). In tropical regions,
marine life appears to be especially sensitive to pollution. Report of the First Session
of the Inter-Governmental Working Group on Marine Pollution, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
48/IWGMP, 1/5, Annex 4, at 3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as IWGMP I].
7. Gold, supra note 2, at 14. For an excellent introductory study of the ocean, see 221
Scr. Air., Sept. 1969. The fear has also been expressed that oil discharges may lead to the
accumulation of carcinogenic substances in human foods. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1970, at
18, col. 3.
8. Douglas, Environmental Problems of the Oceans: The Need for International Con-
trols, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL L. 149, 150 (1971).
9. Lanctot, supra note 6, at 68; Klotz, Are Ocean Polluters Subject to Universal Juris-
diction-Canada Breaks the Ice, 6 INT'L LAW. 706, 707 (1972). In 1930, cannisters
containing 14,000,000 pounds of arsenic were dumped into the Baltic Sea. It is now
feared that these cannisters have decomposed to a state where they may release their
contents into the sea. Douglas, supra note 8, at 151.
10. Schachter & Serwer, supra note 2, at 106.
11. Cundick, Army Nerve Gas Dumping: International Atropine, 56 MILITaRY L. REv.
165, 167-68 (1972).
Five thousand sheep were killed when some gas escaped from the Utah testing grounds.
It is reported that, if inhaled, 0.000003 grams may be lethal. Id. at 167 n.13, 194-95. For
additional information on the dumping operation see the Washington Post, August 11,
1971-August 19, 1971.
12. Cundick, supra note 11, at 188 n.103.
13. Id. at 166.
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Protection Agency's quick action prevented a United States firm from
dumping 140,000 pounds of an arsenic compound into the Atlantic
Ocean.' 4
This Note deals with the international community's attempts, cul-
minating in the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,' 5 to control the intentional
discharge of objectionable materials into international waters. The focus
will be on the various multilateral conventions which have been executed
The problems to be considered include those related to the adequacy of
the definition of objectionable materials; the suitability of enforcement
provisions, including who can enforce an agreement and before what




Although water pollution control has existed since the sixteenth cen-
tury,' 6 a concerted international effort to fight marine pollution did not
begin until this century. In 1926, an international conference was held in
Washington, D.C. to negotiate an agreement on the prohibition of the in-
tentional discharge of oil from ships. The United States prepared a draft
convention but it was never ratified.'7 It was not until 1954 that the inter-
national community was able to agree on the first step in the control of
the intentional discharge of marine pollutants.
A. LoNDoN-1954
In 1954, a convention to control oil pollution of the oceans was ap-
proved in London.'8 The convention, while limited to oil discharges,19
14. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder: Current Developments] BNA ENVIRONMENT RE'. 1276.
15. 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'S 1291 (1972); 102 MONITOR, Dec. 1972, at 7.
16. Between 1531 and 1543, during the reign of Henry VIII, several laws dealing with
the pollution of rivers and streams were enacted: An Act for the Preservation of the
River of Severn, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 9, §§ 2, 6 (1542-43); (An Untitled Act protecting the
Thames River), 27 Hen. 8, c. 18 (1535).
17. Teclaff, International Law and the Protection of the Oceans from Pollution, 40
FoRD. L. REv. 529, 533 (1972); Green, International Law and Canada's Anti-Pollution
Legislation, 50 OREG. L. REV. 462, 463 (1971); 31 DE"T STATE BULL. 311 (1954).
18. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954,
opened for signature May 12, 1954, [19611 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.IA.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter cited as 1954 Convention. Signatories include Japan, Liberia, Panama,
the Soviet Union, and the United States.
19. Id. preamble.
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clearly defines in quantitative terms those discharges which are pro-
hibited,20 those areas in which the prohibition applies,21 and those vessels
to which the convention will apply.22 Unfortunately, the circumstances
under which compliance with the convention is excused are so broad that
most ships are able to escape liability.23
The provisions for the convention's enforcement reveal an even more
serious defect. While any signatory can report an alleged violation, only
the flag state (i.e. the state where the ship is registered) can prosecute an
offender. 24 If the flag state has not been bothered by pollution along its
20. (1) Subject to the provisions of Articles IV and V, the discharge from any
tanker, being a ship to which the Convention applies, within any of the pro-
hibited zones referred to in Annex A [footnote omitted] to the Convention in
relation to tankers of-
(a) oil.
(b) any oily mixture the oil in which fouls the surface of the sea, shall be
prohibited.
For the purposes of this paragraph the oil in an oily mixture of less than 100
parts of oil in 1,000,000 parts of the mixture shall not be deemed to foul the
surface of the sea.
Id. art. m. It should be noted, however, that an unlimited quantity of oil may be dis-
charged provided it is sufficiently diluted.
21. Id. Annex A(1). The prohibited zones include those areas within fifty miles of
land.
22. Id. art. II.
23. Marks, supra note 2, at 87.(I) Article III shall not apply to:
(a) the discharge of oil or of an oily mixture from a ship for the purpose
of securing the safety of the ship, preventing damage to the ship or
cargo, or saving life at sea; or
(b) the escape of oil, or of an oily mixture, resulting from damage to the
ship or unavoidable leakage, if all reasonable precautions have been
taken after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of the leakage
for the purpose of preventing or minimnising the escape ....
1954 Convention, supra note 18, art. IV.
24. (3) Any contravention of paragraphs (1? and (2) of this Article [article III-
see note 20 supra] shail be an offence punishable under the laws of the territory
in which the ship is registered.
Id. art. 111(3). Prosecution, however, is clearly discretionary.
If the Government in the territory of which the ship is registered is satisfied
that sufficient evidence is available in the form required by law to enable pro-
eeedins.., to be taken in respect of the alleged contravention, it shall cause
such proceedings to be taken.
Id. art. X(2). The United States, while signing the convention, "drew attention to the
need for internationally uniform penalties and international uniformity of enforce-
ment." Green, supra note 17, at 467.
The problem of flag state enforcement and the related problem of "flags of conve-
nience" have led to numerous debates. A "flag of convemence" is a country such as
Panama, Liberia, or Honduras whose laws are such that it is easy and inexpensive for
a foreign shipowner to register his vessels. The term has been used in a derogatory
sense to imply that these countries are not quick to make or enforce restrictive shipping
regnlations. B. BOCZaa, FLAGS OF CONvENINCE 2 (1962); Goldie, International Prinfcples
of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 319 n.125 (1970). But see
D. Bowber, Tim Low of taE SeA 57 (1967), who suggests that the "flag of convenience"
countries do exercise adequate jurisdiction, and that objections to flags of convenience
are economic in nature and stem from the use of less expensive foreign crews.
1973]
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shoreline, it may tend to relax its regulations and "appreciate the advan-
tages laxity of regulation gives in shipping circles." 25
The 1954 Convention was amended in 196220 and in 196927 in an at-
tempt to expand the ocean areas where oil discharges are prohibited and
to set limits on the quantity of oil which can be discharged in areas where
some dumping is permitted. These amendments have not satisfactorily im-
proved the original convention. In addition to being limited to oil dis-
charges, and to allowing uncontrolled dumping outside prohibited zones,
the amendments left intact the flag state's prerogative not to initiate any
legal action against a polluter, and failed to introduce mandatory pollu-
tion reduction procedures for all ships. 28
B. THE UNmD NAnONS-1958
The 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,20 which
resulted in the adoption of a series of conventions, did little to resolve
the problem of the intentional pollution of the ocean. The doctrine that
in international waters only the flag state can take any action against its
ships was strengthened by the Conference's ratification of the United
Nations Convention on the High Seas.30 This convention clearly pro-
vides that "[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one State only and ...
shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas." 8' Further-
more, "[n]o arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investiga-
tion, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag
State."32 Clearly the language of this convention prevents coastal states,
25. Note, supra note 2, at 122.
26. Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, Amendments to the Convention of
1954, adopted April 11, 1962, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332.
27. Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization: Conventions Concern-
ing Oil Pollution, in 9 INt's LEGAI MAT'ns 1 (1970). These amendments, however, are
not yet in force. Holdsworth, supra note 2, at 202.
28. See note 2 supra. Legault, The Freedom of the Seas: A License to Pollute? 21 U. oF
ToRoNro L.J. 211, 213 (1971). The 1969 amendments require that the flag state notify
the complaining state of any action taken as a result of information provided by the
complaining state. While some pressure to act may be generated by the fear of adverse
publicity or diplomatic retaliation, this is not a satisfactory arrangement. Mensah, Legal
Problems Relating to Marine Pollution by Oil, in WATER POLLUTION BY OIL 298 (P.
Hepple ed. 1971).
29. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, U.N. Does.
A/CONF. 13/41, 13/42 (1958).
30. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the High Seas]. Parties
to the convention include Guatemala, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and
the United Kingdom.
31. Id. art. 6(1) (emphasis added).
32. Id. art. 11(3). The major exception to this rule is piracy on the high seas. Id. art.
19. Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas does provide that "[f]reedom of the
high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other
rules of international law" (emphasis added). However, there does not appear to be any
[Vol. 7: 32
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the major victims of marine pollution, from acting against foreign ships
to prevent damage to their territorial waters and coastline whenever the
polluting actions of these vessels occur in international waters.
The Conference did require each participating country to draw up
regulations to control the discharge of oil from its own ships and to take
any necessary steps to prevent pollution from radioactive materials 5
This requirement, however, is unsatisfactory, for it fails to specify any
minimum standards; there is thus no guarantee of meaningful action by
participating countries.34 Furthermore, no specific mention is made of the
need to control the many other objectionable materials presently being
dumped into the ocean. The only power which the coastal states acquired
as a result of the Conference was the power to enforce their own anti-
pollution regulations in their territorial sea, the area within twelve
miles of their coastline.3 5
It is thus apparent that even as recently as a decade ago marine pollu-
tion was not seriously considered a problem. Treaties were severely
limited in their coverage to oil and radioactive wastes. Except for the area
of sea within twelve miles of a foreign coastline, a ship could dump objec-
tionable materials with impunity. Enforcement was limited to actions
brought by the flag state against its own vessels, a circumstance which
some authors suggest meant no enforcement.
C. BRussELs-1969
Apparently spurred by events such as the Torrey Canyon disaster,86
recent international agreements have continued to emphasize the prob-
customary rule of international law with regard to ocean dumping which would allow
a coastal state to act in spite of the Convention's restrictions. Teclaff, supra note 17, at
532, 544.
33. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 30, art. 24, provides that "[e]very State
shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil from
ships.. . ." Article 25 further states:
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from the
dumping of radioactive waste, taking into account any standards and regula-
tions which may be formulated by the competent international organizations.
Id. art. 25. For a review of United States regulations on oil pollution, see Note, supra
note 2, at 120-22. A Senate bill to provide a system for controlling the ocean dumping
of materials originating in the United States, S. 1238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., did not pro-
gress through the Congress.
•4. Teclaff, supra note 17, at 534.
35. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958,
arts. 16(1), 17, 24, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
86. The Torrey Canyon went aground in international waters off the coast of Great
Britain in March, 1967, and ruptured, thereby polluting the coastlines of Britain and
France with large quantities of oil. For a discussion of the efforts to combat the spill,
see Cabioch, The Fight Against Pollution by Oil on the Coast of Brittany, in WATER
POT.UrMo nY O. 245-49 (P. Hepple ed. 1971); Rienow & Rienow, supra note 2, at 24;
Note, supra note 2, at 117-18.
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lems of oil pollution, and to ignore the need to define and control the other
objectionable materials which are endangering the oceans. Nevertheless,
these recent agreements do suggest that there may be a lessening of the
flag state's absolute and exclusive control over its vessels; in certain
specified circumstances a coastal state does have the right to act without
regard to the desires of the flag state.
In 1969 an international conference on marine pollution, meeting in
Brussels, adopted two conventions3 7 which are important because, for the
first time, coastal states were given the right to act unilaterally beyond
their own territorial sea to stop marine pollution, and because an owner
could be held civilly liable by the coastal state for damage caused by his
ship. The Convention on Intervention allows coastal states to:
take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate
or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests
from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a mari-
time casualty .... 88
The Convention further provides that:
in cases of extreme urgency requiring measures to be taken immediately, the
coastal state may take measures rendered necessary by the urgency of the situa-
tion, without prior notification or consultation [with the flag state] . . . .80
Admittedly the "maritime casualty" requirement 0 precludes the applica-
tion of the convention to situations of intentional discharge of objec-
tionable materials.41 But the coastal state's right to act "without prior
notification" and "on the high seas" suggests the realization that there is
a need to balance the competing interests of the flag state and the coastal
state.
The conciliation and arbitration provisions of the Convention on In-
37. Note, Reflections on Brussels: IMCO and the 1969 Pollution Conventions. 3 CoR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 161, 166 (1970). The conventions are the International Convention Re-
lating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done No-
vember 29, 1969, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Convention
on Intervention]; and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage, done November 29, 1969, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 45 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Convention on Civil Liability].
Delegations to the conference included representatives from Canada, Guatemala,
Japan, Liberia, the Union of Soviet" Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
38. Convention on Intervention, supra note 37, art. I(l) (emphasis added).
39. Id. art. 111(d) (emphasis added).
40. A "maritime casualty" is defined as a collision, stranding, or occurrence which
results in damage or the threat of damage to the ship or its cargo. Id. art. H1(1).
41. The convention has been criticized because it makes no provision for preventive
measures which can be enforced before a collision has occurred. Green, supra note 17,
at 476.
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tervention are also significant.42 By their terms the flag state no longer
has the absolute power to make, interpret, and enforce its own regulations.
The coastal state may take whatever actions it feels are necessary and in
accord with articles I and III of the Convention. The propriety of these
decisions is to be determined by conciliation and arbitration,43 not by the
unilateral decision of either the coastal state or the flag state.
The Convention on Civil Liability is significant because its express
goal is "to ensure that adequate compensation is available to persons who
suffer damage caused by pollution from the escape or discharge of oil
from ships." 44 Since the "maritime casualty" requirement of the Conven-
tion on Intervention is not present in the Convention on Civil Liability,
the intentional dumping of oil is sufficient grounds to allow a coastal state
to make a claim for damages.
The owner of the ship is liable for the damages inflicted on the territory
and the territorial sea of the injured country as well as for the cost of any
preventive measures. 45 Legal action to secure compensation for pollution
42. Convention on Intervention, supra note 37, art. VIII, Annex. The Annex consists
of nineteen articles which provide in detail for the selection of members to and opera-
tion of a Conciliation Commission and an Arbitration Tribunal, as well as for the issu-
ance of opinions thereby.
43. 1. Any controversy between the Parties as to whether measures taken . . .
were in contravention of the provisions of the present Convention . .. shall
•.. be submitted upon request of any of the Parties concerned to conciliation
or, if conciliation does not succeed, to arbitration ....
Id. art. VII.
44. Convention on Civil Liability, supra note 37, preamble (emphasis added). "'Per-
sons' means any individual or partnership or any public or private body, whether cor-
porate or not, including a State or any of its constituent subdivisions." Id. art. 1(2).
45. Id. arts. II, 111(1).
1. Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a
ship at the time of an incdent... shall be liable for any pollution damage
caused by oil which has escaped or been discharged from the ship as a result
of the incident.
Id. art. Ifl(l). "Incident" is defined as "any occurrence, or series of occurrences having
the same origin, which causes pollution." Id. art. 1(8).
Some authorities have construed the convention as imposing strict liability. See Green,
supra note 17, at 475; Teclaff, supra note 17, at 545; Note,.supra note 37, at 178. Others
have interpreted it as intending absolute liability. See Goldie, supra note 24, at 316;
Swan, International and National Approaches to Oil Pollution Responsibility: An
Emerging Regime for a Global Problem, 50 One-. L. REv. 506, 528 (1971). A third posi-
tion suggests that the liability involved falls somewhere between fault and strict liability.
See Utton, A Survey of National Laws on the Control of Pollution from Oil and Gas
Operations on the Continental Shelf, 9 COLUm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 331, 358 (1970).
To some extent the confusion may be simply a matter of semantics; however, it is
also indicative of the changing standards of liability in international law. Joseph C.
Sweeny has listed five different types of liability (including fault liability, strict liability,
and absolute liability)-Sweeny, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FoRDH. L. REv. 155,
195-200 (1968); and Professor L.F.E. Goldie has suggested a scale of liability dependent
on the exact "social situation" which is being considered. Goldie, supra note 24, at
317-19.
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damages must be brought in the courts of the injured coastal state,40
thereby eliminating the fear of lax enforcement of regulations by the
flag state. Without directly interfering with the doctrine of freedom of
the seas, the coastal states, by the terms of the convention, have acquired
a degree of indirect control over the flag state's ships.
While the two conventions have been hailed as "pacesetting mile-
stones,"47 such enthusiasm may be overly optimistic. Neither convention
attempts to handle the broad problem of the discharge of objectionable
materials into the ocean. Instead, they have chosen to limit themselves to
the narrow problem of oil pollution.48 The conventions have been further
criticized for not covering damage to marine life in the high seas (e.g.,
damage to fishing grounds),49 and for failing to establish a system of ab-
solute liability without exceptions.50 Finally, the reliance on national
court systems in the Convention on Civil Liability would seem simply to
trade the potential bias of the flag state's courts for that of the coastal
state's courts.51 In Canada's view, however, the two conventions still "[do]
not pay sufficient attention to the fundamental interests of the coastal
states as compared with the commercial interests of the flag states."52
The two conventions do suggest, however, a trend toward balancing
the interests of flag states and coastal states. In appropriate cases, a coastal
It does appear, nonetheless, that fault liability will no longer be considered as a basis
for liability in pollution cases. Teclaff, supra note 17, at 544, 547. The various treaties
covering the operation of nuclear devices have provided for absolute liability (meaning
a more rigorous form than that labeled as strict liability). Goldie, supra note 24, at
310-14. Under these treaties, no exoneration based on force majeure, acts of God, or
intervening acts of third parties is available. Id.
46. Convention on Civil Liability, supra note 37, art. IX.
47. Petaccio, Water Pollution and the Future Law of the Sea, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
15, 18 (1972).
48. The conference specifically recommended, however, that something should be
done with regard to other pollutants. Resolution on International Co-operation Con-
cerning Pollutants Other than Oil, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MA"Ls 65 (1970).
49. Green, supra note 17, at 475; Swan, supra note 45, at 526.
50. Mendelsohn, Ocean Pollution and the 1972 United Nations Conference on the
Environment, 3 J. MAA-twi L. & Com. 385, 390 (1972); Letter from Senator Edmund
S. Muskie to Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Nov. 17, 1971, in 3 J. MAiunmw L. &
CoM. 427, 428 (1972); see also, Convention on Civil Liability, supra note 37, art. III,
which reads in part:
2. No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that
the damage:(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities.., or a natural phenomena of
an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause dam-
age by a third party ....Id. art. flI.
51. Lanctot, supra note 6, at 89; and cf. note 24 supra.
52. Green, supra note 17, at 476.
[Vol. 7: 32
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state may act on the high seas against the ship of another state without
violating the principles of freedom of the high seas. Furthermore, the
conventions recognize the civil liability of ship owners for damage caused
by pollution due to the discharge or escape of oil, thereby giving the
coastal state some indirect control over the conduct of a ship in inter-
national waters. Finally, the conciliation and arbitration provisions of
the Convention on Intervention do much to eliminate many of the objec-
tions which were raised to the use of national court systems.
III
THE PRESENT SITUATION
A. THE UNiTED NATIONS
The international community appears to have accepted the argument
that at best the Brussels agreements leave the world "one convention
behind the next... disaster." 53 The treaties do not provide adequate pro-
tection, because only oil pollution is covered and there is no right of
action prior to an accident.
In 1969, the United Nations General Assembly requested that the Secre-
tary-General both review the operations of the various national and inter-
national organizations which were dealing with the problem of marine
pollution, and inquire into the feasibility of drafting an international
treaty.54 The Secretary-General subsequently reported that there was no
existing international agreement which effectively controlled marine pol-
lution; the existing international agreements were either too broad, failing
to provide for the enforcement of many of the concepts which were agreed
to, or too narrow, failing to be applicable to much of the existing range
of pollution problems.55
In preparation for the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment 56 the Preparatory Committee established the Intergovern-
mental Working Group on Marine Pollution (IWGMP) for the purpose
53. Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 398; see Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of
Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian View, 3 J. MALrME L. & Com. 1, 8 (1972).
54. GA. Res. 2566, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
55. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 1, at para. 135.
56. Established by GA. Res. 2398, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968). The conference was held in Stockholm in June, 1972. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1972,
at 1, col. 1.
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of formulating a draft convention on ocean dumping.57 The IWGMP
met several times, and eventually prepared and forwarded a draft con-
vention on ocean dumping to the United Nations Conference.56 Unfor-
tunately, and apparently for reasons unrelated to the content of the draft
convention, no definitive action was taken on the convention at the
Human Environment Conference,59 although there was support for the
completion of an ocean dumping convention.6 0
B. Tim LONDON CONFERENCE
An intergovernmental conference was held in London between October
30 and November 13, 1972, for the purpose of drafting and adopting a
global convention on ocean dumping.61 Over ninety countries partici-
pated,62 and the result was the adoption of the London Convention on
Ocean Dumping.63
The convention consists of a preamble, twenty-two articles, and three
annexes. The preamble acknowledges that the sea can not be treated as
an indestructible and unlimited resource, and that some action must be
taken, without delay, to control the pollution of the sea. 64
The coverage of the convention is desirably broad. "Dumping" in-
cludes any deliberate disposal of matter (including the deliberate disposal
of vessels);65 "'[s]ea' means all marine waters other than the internal
57. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/PC. 11, at paras. 194, 195, 197 (1971); Identification and
Control of Pollutants of Broad International Significance, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/8/
Add. 1, at 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Identification of Pollutants].
58. Identification of Pollutants, supra note 57, at 3.
59. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1972, at 24, col. 8.
60. 102 MoNrroR, December, 1972, at 4-5.
61. Id. at 6; N.Y. Times, November 14, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
62. Participants included Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Liberia, Panama, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There were
also observers from organizations such as the International Maritime Consultative
Organization; the Secretary-General of the United Nations was also represented. 11
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1291-92 (1972).
63. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1291 (1972);
102 MONITOR, Dec. 1972, at 7 [hereinafter cited as London Convention on Ocean Dump-
ing]. The Convention will come into force after it has been ratified by fifteen countries.
Id. art. XIX. The United States and the Soviet Union signed the convention on Decem-
ber 29, 1972. The Hartford (Conn.) Courant, December 30, 1972, at 5, col. 4.
64. London Convention on Ocean Dumping, supra note 63, preamble.
65. 1. (a) "Dumping" means:
(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from ves-
sels, aircraft... or other man-made structures at sea;
(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels ....Id. art. HI.
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waters of States"; 66 and "[w]astes or other matter" are defined as material
and substance of any kind, form, or description. 67 The London Conven-
tion on Ocean Dumping is not limited, as were previous conventions, to
only oil discharges or to just certain types of ships.68 This change is note-
worthy.69
The convention's strongest point is its prohibition of the dumping of
specific materials (e.g. oil, radioactive materials, and chemical and bio-
logical warfare weapons) and the listing of criteria for the evaluation of
the suitability of all other materials for dumping.7 0 The dumping of non-
prohibited materials requires the issuance of a permit prior to the disposal
of the material.
The permit system is desirable because it allows the designated national
licensing body to examine the potential damage to the ocean, taking into
account the material to be dumped, the quantity of material, and the
proposed dumping site, prior to the time the dumping occurs, rather than
restricting enforcement to remedial measures such as fines after the ocean
has been damaged.7' Although some sources have criticized this system
as effectively legalizing ocean dumping,72 permitting some dumping
recognizes the ocean's capacity to act as a waste treatment facility. It is
important to recognize, however, that this capacity to handle waste
material is not unlimited.73
66. Id. art. 111(3) (emphasis added). There is no distinction between the high seas and
the territorial sea of a coastal state.
67. Id. art. I/H(4) (emphasis added).
68. See 1954 Convention, supra note 18, art. H; and see Convention on Civil Liability,
supra note 37, art. I(1). The London Convention on Ocean Dumping, supra note 63, art.
111(2), provides that "[vessels] and aircraft" mean waterborne or airborne craft of any
type whatsoever.
69. See Mendelsohn, supra note 50, at 398; and see Beesley, supra note 53, at 8.
70. The London Convention on Ocean Dumping, supra note 63, art. IV provides:
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Convention Contracting Parties
shall prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter in whatever form or
other condition except as otherwise specified below:
a. The dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex I is prohibited;
b. The dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex II requires a prior
special permit;
c. The dumping of all other wastes or matter requires a prior general permit.
Annex I provides that materials such as mercury, persistent plastics, persistent synthetic
materials, oil, radioactive wastes, and material for biological and chemical warfare shall
not be dumped. Annex 11 provides that special care must be taken when dumping
materials which contain arsenic, lead, cyanides, pesticides which are not banned by
Annex I, and several other chemicals. Annex III provides a 21-item checklist of charac-
teristics of the material to be dumped, and of the dumping site, as well as other related
factors which must be considered prior to the issuance of any permit.
71. Lanctot, supra note 6, at 103.
72. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/PC. 13, at para. 122 (1971).
73. See Identification of Pollutants, supra note 57, at 4, preamble.
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As with its predecessors, 74 however, the biggest fault in the convention
is the lack of any provisions for its uniform and effective enforcement.
The convention provides that:
1. Each Contracting Party shall designate an appropriate authority or authori-
ties to:
a. issue special permits ...
b. issue general permits ... .75
2. Each Party shall take in its territory appropriate measures to prevent and
punish conduct in contravention of the provisions of this Convention.78
The establishment of over ninety national authorities for the purpose
of issuing permits can only lead to confusion and to the creation of a
variety of interpretations of the Annexes. This confusion could, as the
result of questionable interpretations of the convention, lead to the crea-
tion of "pollution havens," in the same way that some states have become
tax shelters or "flags of convenience." 77 An international organization
should be established at least to insure that data concerning the effects
of chemicals and other materials is available to all interested parties.78
Additionally such an organization could finance research into the effects
of new materials on the sea and, in appropriate cases, add materials to
either the Annex I or Annex II listings.79
Regional organizations, to deal with the problems of specific geograph-
ical regions such as enclosed seas (e.g. Baltic Sea, North Sea, Mediterranean
Sea) could be established to supplement the minimum standards set by
the international organizationS0 The London Convention on Ocean
Dumping does anticipate the possibility of regional organizations,81 but
74. See notes 23 S& 30 supra and accompanying text.
75. London Convention on Ocean Dumping, supra note 63, art. VI.
76. Id. art. VII.
77. Lanctot, supra note 6, at 89.
78. COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, TWENTY-THIRD REPORT: THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE OCEANS: CURRENT ISSUES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 24 (1973).
Lanctot, supra note 6, at 90-91; Teclaff, supa note 17, at 563; Kennan, To Prevent a
World Wasteand, 48 FOREIGN Ars. 401, 405 (1970).
79. Within their own limited spheres agencies such as the Intergovernmental Mari-
time Consultative Organization (IMCO) and the Organization for Economic Develop-
ment Cooperation (OEDC) do resemble international bodies promulgating rules and
regulations. IMCO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, deals in an advisory and
consultative manner on technical shipping matters and has assisted in the drafting of
the 1954 Convention and the two 1969 Brussels Conventions. Note, supra note 37, at
162-64. It has been proposed that an organization such as IMCO be used as an inter-
national body responsible for the control of marine pollution. Kennan, supra note 78,
at 406; IWGMP I, supra note 6, at para. 17.
80. Lanctot, supra note 6, at 89, 92.
81. In order to further the objectives of this Convention the Contracting Parties
with common interests to protect in the marine environment in a given geo-
[Vol. 7: 32
Saving a Dying Sea?
it neither attempts to define those areas which are in immediate need of
attention nor provides any guidelines as to the structure of a regional
organization.
The convention does follow the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone82 in allowing a coastal state to act against a ship
within the coastal state's territorial waters.88 The convention goes further,
however, and permits enforcement, in international waters, not only by
the flag state, but also by the state where the matter to be dumped is
initially loaded.8 4 But the coastal states are still deprived of any power
to enforce the convention unless the ship is in the coastal state's terri-
torial waters, a limitation which must be viewed as a serious defect.8 5
Canada has repeatedly argued that coastal states, or perhaps all of the
parties to a dumping control convention, should have enforcement rights
against all vessels on the high seas.86 This has some basis in international
law, which permits any ship on the high seas to arrest a pirate ship.8 7
Furthermore, various North Atlantic countries have signed a convention
empowering authorized officers of a contracting country to stop and board
graphical area shall endeavour ... to enter into regional agreements consistent
with this Convention for the prevention of pollution ....
London Convention on Ocean Dumping, supra note 63, art. VIII.
82. Note 34 supra and accompanying text.
83. Each Party shall take in its territory appropriate measures to prevent and
punish conduct in contravention of the provisions of this Convention.
London Convention on Ocean Dumping, supra note 63, art. VIII(2).
84. 1. Each Contracting Party shall apply the measures required to implement the
present convention to all:
a. vessels and aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag;
b. vessels and aircraft loading in its territory or territorial seas matter which
is to be dumped ....
Id. art. VII(l).
85. The suggestion that coastal states should also be allowed to enforce the terms of
an international convention has met with some resistance. The biggest fears seem to be
the belief that there would be differences in interpretations of the convention resulting
in ships being driven from one part of the ocean to another with a more flexible in-
terpretation. In an extreme case, the ships of an individual country might be discrimi-
nated against. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 3 SR. 3-14, at 35,
53 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Sea-Bed Records]. But see Id. at 74, and Beesley,
supra note 53, at 7- suggesting the need to give the coastal states more power to act-
and see Kennan, supra note 78 at 405-recommending that enforcement should be by
a single international body.
86. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 3/SR. 15-19, at 92 (1972);
1971 Sea-Bed Records, supra note 85, at 121-22. The Canadian position was presented
during a discussion of the United Nations Draft Convention on Ocean Dumping, supra
note 57, an agreement very similar to the London Convention on Ocean Dumping.
87. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 30, art. 19.
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another member-state's fishing vessels while that vessel is operating on
the high seas of the North Atlantic. 88
The London Convention does provide that:
[t]he Parties agree to cooperate in the development of procedures for the
effective application of this Convention, particularly on the high seas, including
procedures for the reporting of vessels and aircraft observed dumping in con-
travention of the Convention.89
This article, however, seems to acknowledge that at present there is no
adequate method of enforcing the convention, particularly on the high
seas. The injured party has no impartial enforcement body to which it
can turn and be assured of action.
The convention is also deficient because of its failure to establish any
standard of liability for damage caused by either legal or illegal dump-
ing.90 Also, there is neither an established impartial tribunal to settle dis-
putes, nor any provisions by which one could be convened to evaluate
confficts and award damages. 91 Finally, there is no mention of the problem
of how to handle damage to a "world resource." If an international fishing
ground is damaged, if some of the other living resources of the sea are
killed, or if the sea is simply rendered aesthetically less pleasing, there
are no provisions delineating who could bring a charge of conduct in
contravention of the convention.92 It is also unclear who would receive
any damages which were awarded, or, indeed, if damages could be
awarded at all for such actions.
The main hope of the convention lies in articles VII and X. Article X
provides that:
[in accordance with the principles of international law regarding State respon-
sibility for damage to the environment of other States or to any other area
of the environment, caused by dumping of wastes and other matter of all kinds,
the Contracting Parties undertake to develop procedures for the assessment
of liability and the settlement of disputes regarding dumping.08
88. Convention on Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic, art. 9,
opened for signature June 1, 1967, in 6 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 760, 762 (1967). This con-
vention also provides that "no vessel shall dump in the sea any article or substance
which may interfere with fishing or obstruct or cause damage to fish ...." Id. at
Annex V, rule 4. The former United States Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, has
characterized the enforcement provision of the convention as "a major step forward."
Letter from William P. Rogers to President Nixon, Mar. 29, 1969, in 63 Am. J. INT'L L.
806, 808 (1969).
89. London Convention on Ocean Dumping, supra note 63, art. VII(S).
90. For a discussion of the problem of liability, see note 45 supra.
91. See notes 42 & 43 supra and accompanying text for the conciliation and arbitration
provisions of the Convention on Intervention.
92. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
93. London Convention on Ocean Dumping, supra note 63, art. X.
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It will be the meetings of the signatories (where the problems raised in
articles VII(8) and X are to be faced)94 which will determine if the Lon-
don Convention on Ocean Dumping is to have any lasting value. The
initiation of action by any party, before an impartial tribunal, and upon
standards of absolute liability for damage to the environment wherever
that damage may occur, is not yet a reality.
CONCLUSION
"[T]he subject of marine pollution [is] one [of the] most deserving of
priority for concrete action, indeed demanding of action by the interna-
tional community ... ."95 The evidence establishes the need to control
the dumping of waste materials into the sea before it is irreparably dam-
aged. The earlier conventions on ocean dumping have been confined, in
general, to the discharge of oil. In addition, these conventions did not
purport to cover all vessels, and their enforcement and liability provi-
sions are not satisfactory. With the exception of the narrow set of cir-
cumstances in which the Convention on Intervention is applicable,
enforcement has been exclusively within the control of the flag state, and
has been based on the use of national court systems.
The London Convention on Ocean Dumping, in contrast, applies to
all vessels, and its strongest points are a definitive list of prohibited and
restricted materials, and the establishment of criteria for evaluating mate-
rials not individually listed. The use of a licensing system is also note-
worthy. The convention acknowledges the ability of the ocean to handle
some quantity of waste material, but provides for an evaluation of the
environmental impact of the proposed dumping before any damage can
be done. These points are dear improvements over the provisions in
earlier conventions.
A final assessment of the effectiveness of the London Convention on
Ocean Dumping, however, must await an examination of the procedures
to be established in accordance with the mandate of articles VII, X, and
XI.9 6 Coastal states must be given some method of protecting their in-
94. "The Contracting Parties shall at their first consultative meeting consider pro-
cedures for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of
this Convention." Id. art. XI.
95. Address by Maurice F. Strong, Secretary-General of the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment, IWGMP I, supra note 6, Annex IV, at 1.
96. See notes 89, 93 and 94 supra and accompanying text.
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terests, either by resort to conciliation and arbitration procedures, or by
initiation of an action before a regional or international body. Addi-
tionally, parties which intentionally dump objectionable materials must
be held absolutely liable for any damage which results, and a procedure
must be established for instituting an action when the high seas have been
damaged.
The London Convention on Ocean Dumping is a significant improve-
ment in the area of defining objectionable materials and bringing them
within the scope of the convention. Any evaluation of its enforcement
provisions, however, must await ratification of the convention and the
initial organizational meetings.
Michael S. Schenker
